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Abstract
This paper reports the finding of a survey of inflation perceptions and inflation 
expectations in South Africa undertaken in 2014. This survey posed questions 
on perceptions of past inflation (historic inflation) and expectations of future 
inflation to the same respondents and determined linkages between historic 
views and future expectations of each respondent. The analysis of the survey 
data shows that inflation expectations are anchored in inflation perceptions. 
This research aligns South Africa with other countries and jurisdictions where 
such surveys are undertaken. This paper shows conclusively, for the first 
time in South Africa, that there is a feed through from inflation perception to 
inflation expectations. Therefore, inflation perceptions play a crucial role in 
the formulation of inflation expectations in South Africa. These results suggest 
that policy makers are not just charged with containing inflation expectations, 
but they should also be aware that the confidence in official statistics, as well 
as the confidence in the SA Reserve Bank and government, impacts inflation 
perceptions which directly feed into inflation expectations. 




Central banks can have any one of a number of monetary policy objectives 
or mandates. These objectives can include any of (or any combinations of) 
price stability, price level stability, financial stability, exchange rate stability, 
economic growth and/or employment. This paper deals with South African data, 
a country where the central bank has a clear mandate for price stability and 
financial stability. This paper focuses on the first of these two objectives, namely 
the achievement of price stability. In the case of South Africa this is defined as 
keeping the inflation rate between 3 and 6 per cent per annum, the country’s 
inflation target range (Comert and Epstein, 2011: S96). 
Research on the banking sector in South Africa, both historically and in recent 
times, has tended to concentrate on commercial and private banking (see for 
example Stuart Jones, 1996; Mabwe and Webb, 2010). Research on the South 
African central bank includes a commissioned special issue to commemorate 
the 90th anniversary of the South African Reserve Bank which included papers 
that covered a number of issues on the South African central bank, including 
its origins and history, its success or failure addressing inflation over time, the 
merits and limitations of inflation targeting, and the matter of its unique private 
shareholding system, among others (see Rossouw and Padayachee, 2011). Other 
research on the topic of inflation and inflation expectations has usually focused 
on the expectations of economic agents (see Ehlers and Steinbach, 2007; Reid, 
2012; and Kabundi, Schaling and Some, 2014). Research into the possible 
existence of links between inflation perceptions and inflation expectations is 
virtually non-existent, thus making this paper somewhat unique. Furthermore, 
by using survey data from individuals, and not economic agents to show that 
inflation expectations are indeed anchored in inflation perceptions, this paper 
moves the theoretical and the policy debate about the management of inflation 
in inflation targeting regimes forward in significant ways.
This paper has five objectives. First, it explores literature on the process of 
forming inflation perceptions and inflation expectations. Ranyard et al. (2008) 
show how individuals’ socio-economic environment impact on their formulation 
of perceptions and expectations. As described in Bosch et al., ‘Inflation 
expectations are related to expected future changes in price levels, and therefore 
in inflation (i.e. the rate of change in the price level over time), while inflation 
perceptions are used to describe backward-looking views on past price-level 
movements and historic inflation’ (2015:1).
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It is critical in any inflation targeting regime that the central bank knows 
something about the existence and the nature of the link between inflation 
perceptions and inflation expectations. If it can be demonstrated that, indeed, 
inflation perceptions play a crucial role in the formulation of inflation expectations, 
policy makers should not just focus on containing inflation expectations, but 
they should also ensure through their communication mechanisms that the 
public gains sound knowledge about, and retains confidence in, official price 
data, in statistics capability, as well as in the institution of the central bank 
itself and in the government. The centrality of consistent, accurate and effective 
communication by the monetary authorities, as well as by government, in all 
matters related to information dissemination both about inflation and prices, 
and about general economic data cannot be over-emphasized (see Reid and du 
Plessis, 2011). Therefore this paper addresses the question of the existence or 
otherwise of the link between inflation perceptions and inflation expectations 
in the South African case, an exercise that has not been attempted in South 
Africa before, and which remains under-researched in most other jurisdictions 
(see Rossouw, Padayachee and Bosch, 2009).
Secondly, this paper disseminates the results of the fourth round of a survey 
on inflation perceptions and inflation expectations in South Africa, undertaken 
among consumers. The fourth round builds on the methodology of earlier 
surveys. The novelty of the results of this fourth round lies in the fact that the 
same respondents were asked for the first time in South Africa to provide views 
on the accuracy of historic inflation figures and to provide their expectations 
of future inflation. This approach is aligned to the methodology followed in 
a number of other countries, as is explained in the literature review. Earlier 
research only focused on inflation perceptions.
The use of the terminology ‘consumers’ in the context of this paper can be 
the subject of some debate. The results of inflation surveys among individual 
responses are often reported as household surveys (see for instance Kershoff 
and Smit, 2002). However, this is a misnomer, as the views of one member (not 
necessarily the head) of a household are recorded.  These responses can therefore 
at best be reported as ‘individual responses’ or the views of ‘consumers’, the 
approach followed in this paper.
Bosch et al. (2015, p.6) state that ‘(t)he expectations channel is one channel 
of the transmission mechanism, so anchoring inflation expectations is one of 
the ways (albeit an important one) that a central bank can use to maintain price 
stability’. In a South African context, Smal and De Jager (2001) highlighted 
170
as far back as 2001 the role of inflation expectations in the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism.  Inflation expectations remain one of the factors that the 
SA Reserve Bank considers in monetary policy decisions. Berk (2000) explains 
that a central bank lacking credibility in its policy action in a quest to contain 
inflation within a target range could result in expected inflation exceeding the 
inflation target. Benford and Driver (2008) observe that inflation expectations 
are partly formed on the basis of the past values of actual inflation.
This paper reports on the first testing of this observation for South African 
consumers.  Research covering aspects of one element of the research reported 
in this paper has been done by Kabundi et al. (2014). Kabundi et al. (2014) 
assessed inflation expectations for trade unionists, business people and analysts. 
This paper reports much broader research findings, namely the inflation 
expectations of a representative sample of the South African population (rather 
than only certain groups as was used by Kabundi et al., 2014) and their historic 
inflation perceptions. 
Thirdly, this paper assesses the probability of respondents answering 
(by providing a value) to questions about inflation, rather than to provide a 
‘don’t know’ response. Fourthly, the paper highlights differences in inflation 
perceptions and inflation expectations, for instance differences based on age, 
gender or income. 
Lastly, the paper tests for and confirms feed through from inflation perceptions 
to inflation expectations among South African consumers.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 summarises literature on inflation 
perception and inflation expectation surveys. Section 3 considers consumers’ 
understanding of inflation. Section 4 deals with inflation perceptions and 
inflation expectations. Section 5 concludes.
2. Literature review
2.1. On inflation perceptions and inflation expectation surveys
A review of available literature shows that central banks pay considerable 
attention to inflation expectations (see for instance Banco Central de Chile, 
2008; Berk, 1999; Forsells and Kenny, 2002; Powers, 2005; SA Reserve Bank, 
2008; Samuels 1967; or Sveriges Riksbank, 2008).  To the contrary, the inflation 
perceptions of consumers receive less attention.  The reason is that containing 
inflation is by its very nature a forward-looking exercise, i.e. central banks take 
policy actions that will influence demand and inflation after a lag of some 12 to 
24 months.
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The literature shows considerable differences in the ways in which central 
banks assess expectations of future inflation.  Rossouw et al. (2009) have found 
that central banks use various combinations of the following to assess inflation 
expectations:
• Surveys of inflation expectations from groups of respondents (e.g., business 
people, consumers and/or trade unionists);
• Interest rate differentials between different asset classes (e.g., the yield on 
conventional bonds compared to the yield on inflation-linked bonds); and
• Inflation forecasts by financial market analysis.
Inflation expectation surveys are undertaken to assess the anchoring (or 
lack thereof) in the inflation target range of the country where the survey is 
undertaken.  The theory underpinning this approach is that economic agents 
act according to their expectations.  If inflation expectations are well above the 
inflation target range, the expectation is that expenditure will increase to avert 
future price increases, thus increasing near-term demand and therefore pressure 
on prices.  For this reason, inflation expectations receive considerable attention 
in the policy deliberations of central banks in inflation-targeting countries. 
Inflation expectations of business people, consumers1 and trade unionists are 
reported in the monetary policy reviews/inflation reports of central banks (see 
for instance Bank for International Settlements, 2008; Bank of Iceland, 2003; 
Blinder, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, de Haan, and Jansen, 2008; Blinder and Wyplosz, 
2005; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2005; Fracasso,  Genberg and Wyplosz., 2003; or 
Leeper, 2003 on this matter).  More recently, Kabundi et al. (2014) decomposed 
the inflation expectations surveyed by the Bureau for Economic Research (BER) 
into the same three groups to identify which group were responsible for driving 
inflation expectations. 
Bi-ennial representative inflation perception surveys of consumers have been 
undertaken as a private initiative in South Africa since 2006. These surveys 
cover a representative sample of the South African population. Bi-ennial 
surveys, rather than annual or even quarterly surveys are undertaken as these 
representative surveys are expensive. These surveys cover the views of 3 500 
male and female consumers from metropolitan, urban and rural areas and 
provide views of respondents aged 16 and older.  The specifications of the survey 
1. In the case of South Africa the inflation expectations of consumers (called household inflation 
expectation surveys) are not reported in the Monetary Policy Review of the SA Reserve Bank.
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composition provide additional confirmation that the results of these surveys 
cannot be viewed as ‘household survey data’. These surveys are used to assess 
the degree in which consumers have confidence that historic inflation figures 
are an accurate reflection of actual price increases (see for instance Bosch et al., 
2015 for a review of such surveys).
In 2014, the South African inflation perception surveys were expanded 
and posed for the first time to the same South African respondents, questions 
regarding their perception of past inflation, and what their expectation of future 
inflation is, thus linking these two aspects. The results are reported in this paper.
Similar surveys are undertaken on behalf of central banks in a number of 
other countries and jurisdictions, mainly with policy considerations in mind. 
For instance, Badarinza and Buchmann (2009:5) state that ‘survey data from 
the European Commission's Business and Consumer Survey … (is used for) 
… the purpose of quantifying disagreement in perceptions and expectations … 
(of inflation) … and constitutes one set of dependent variables being used for 
sub-sequent econometric analysis’ in the euro area (see also Lindén 2005 on this 
matter). This data has been collected since 2003 (Biau et al., 2010:1).  
Biau et al. (2010:1) state that‘(t)he results indicate that consumers hold very 
different opinions of inflation: perceptions and expectations of inflation range 
from high, or in some cases very high, to low and close to the official rate of 
inflation. For the euro area as a whole, consumers generally tend to overestimate 
actual inflation developments, particularly in terms of inflation perceptions…’ 
The survey results from the euro area show that ‘…respondents reveal very 
different perceptions and predictions of inflation depending on their income, 
age, education and gender’. (Biau et al., 2010:1). Irrespective of the reasons for 
inflation perceptions and inflation expectations ranging from low to high or the 
actual level of these aspects, linkages between the level of perceptions and the 
level of expectations are important.
Likewise, inflation perception surveys among consumers are undertaken in 
New Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom, also with monetary policy 
objectives in mind (see for instance Brachinger, 2005; Jonung, 1981; Palmqvist 
and Stromberg, 2004; Pike et al., 2008 or Reserve Bank of New Zealand, [S.a.]). 
As in the case of the United Kingdom, survey results in Sweden show that 
‘…with respect to the perceived rate … (of inflation) …the major difference 
… (of 1,7 percentage points) … was found between men and women. … The 
difference between men and women apparently indicates that perceived rates 
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are influenced by individual expenditure patterns’ (Jonung, 1981:968; see also 
Brachinger, 2005).
The Reserve Bank of India has been using quarterly household inflation 
surveys since 2005. It is interesting to note that these surveys focus on inflation 
perceptions and inflation expectations, whereas the inflation surveys of central 
banks in many other countries focus only on inflation expectations. The Reserve 
Bank of India reports that ‘…most recent inflation developments, and particularly 
those relating to salient items in consumption baskets, tend to influence these 
expectations…’ (Reserve Bank of India, 2016:2). However, the survey of the 
Reserve Bank of India covers only urban respondents, while the survey results 
reported in our paper covers urban and rural respondents.
The Bank of Japan also compiles a review of households’ inflation expectations. 
Nishiguchi et al. (2014) used this survey, which was first conducted in 1993, 
to analyse the degree of dispersion and disagreement of inflation expectations. 
The results show that even if mean or median expectations remain the same, 
the shape of distribution of inflation expectations may have changed, which 
provides information about the variability and stability of inflation expectations.
Similar surveys were undertaken among consumers between August 1998 
and April 2002 by the Columbus Dispatch in Ohio in the United States of 
America on behalf of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (Bryan and 
Ventaku, 2001b). The survey results confirmed a link between consumers’ 
perceptions of inflation and their demographic characteristics. Respondents 
with ‘…high incomes perceive and anticipate much less inflation than people 
with low incomes, married people less than singles, whites less than nonwhites, 
and middle-aged people less than young people … (and) … men and women 
hold very different views on the rate at which prices are changing’ (Bryan and 
Ventaku, 2001b). This finding concurs with the findings of Biau et al. (2010), 
Brachinger (2005) and Jonung (1981). Bryan and Venkatu (2001a) point out 
those consumers’ inflation expectations might be indicative of how consumers 
perceive historic price movements. This paper considers this the findings of 
Bryan and Ventaku (2001a) in a South African context.  
2.2. On consumers’ understanding of inflation
Ranyard et al (2008) follow Behrend (1977) to show that the understanding of 
inflation by the general public is limited, and that households are not fully aware 
of the personal significance of price changes, including the relationship between 
wages and prices. The level of awareness was further found to be a function of 
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how active households were in the economy or their relevant education (such as 
economic students). All groups however showed some degree of understanding 
that was in line with the expert view, suggesting that even at the basic level 
individuals construct some form of adaptive decision making.
Bastounis et al. (2004) examine the role of psychological variables related 
to general attitudinal orientations and beliefs on the way ‘lay people’ think 
about economic phenomena, using a large cross sectional sample of peoples 
of heterogeneous cultures (Austria, France, Israel, Singapore, Turkey, among 
others). They couple this with the use of an instrument to measure beliefs about 
the cause of events in economic life. The results showed that participants’ 
answers regarding the consequences of economic phenomena such as inflation, 
unemployment, interest rates and taxation policies were only thematically 
coherent.  In general people who felt that they do not control their lives, distrust 
business and protest against the unfair treatment of workers, a broadly left wing 
view2 of the economy, ‘…see the world as an unjust place, they rather support 
government intervention in welfare and are not satisfied by the economy on a 
personal or national level’ Bastounis et al. (2004:273). In relation to inflation 
perceptions, respondents in the sample distrusted supply forces (business) that 
they see as causing inflation. On the other hand, those people who believed that 
they had greater control of their destiny, generally expressed satisfaction with 
the economic system. They tended not to support government intervention such 
as price control, but support business initiatives and activities as a means to fight 
inflation. In other words, a more conservative right wing political orientation. In 
general lay knowledge appeared to consist of fragmentary pieces of information 
and recollections (remembering) rather than precision about data or theories.
Leiser and Drori (2005) analyse and compare the ‘social representations 
of inflation’ (2005:3) in four groups of people in Israel who did not have the 
benefit of a formal education in economics. Such a naïve group’s understanding 
of economic phenomena is shaped by a number of social and cognitive forces. 
Mapping the psychology of inflation involves ‘identifying the associations, 
explanations and causal reasoning utilized by the respondents as a function of 
their economic position and socialization’ (Leiser and Drori 2005:14). But ‘intra-
psychological’ factors matter, too. Identifying the varied cognitive systems that 
inform naïve understanding is also important. In short: ‘Associations, heuristics, 
analogies to everyday experience, and understanding of economic phenomena 
2. Left wing and right wing terminology is used here in the same context as by Bastounis et al. 
(2004).
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all have their place in an account of the meaning of inflation to lay persons’ 
(Leiser and Drori 2005:14). By means of summary, these interventions show that 
respondents’ perception is that inflation results in high(er) prices with a lower 
value of the currency and devaluation. However, the most important result here 
were the missing concepts by respondents: salaries, industry, unemployment 
and the government. The results showed that across the four groups the depth of 
understanding, the concepts and the complexity of the explanations were very 
different. More than 80 per cent of the explanations for the links offered by the 
respondents lacked depth or were not well thought through.
Leung (2009) attempts to find explanations for why New Zealand’s (1000 
strong) household surveys of inflation expectations consistently find over-
predictions of inflation. Leung (2009) sets out comparable studies elsewhere 
including in South Africa, where she references the BER studies (Kershoff, 
2000) which found that ‘(t)he inflation expectations of lower income and 
younger households are lower, and [that] there was no difference amongst 
households of different education’ (2009:36). Her findings show that (in terms 
of age) the young have a higher upward inflation bias, that (in terms of ethnicity) 
respondents of [what she refers to as] non-European ethnicity had a much higher 
inflation bias relative to [what she refers to as] Europeans, that (in terms of 
gender) females had a higher inflation bias than males, and that finally (in terms 
of income) increases in real income reduced inflation bias, as did skill levels. She 
accepts that some of these variables may reflect differences in the awareness of 
economic issues, based for example on the ‘tone’ of media reports, which show 
that the more highly educated were more responsive to media reports about 
inflation issues. (2009:38). From a policy perspective this may suggest that the 
New Zealand central bank could potentially ‘… bring down the overall inflation 
bias of households with education efforts targeted towards those groups with the 
greatest bias in their perceptions’ (2009:41).
In a number of papers, Simon Kemp (1987; 1991) has studied the impact of 
time, dating and remembering on how samples of residents gauge price changes. 
In a study of 150 German residents Kemp (1991) found that these residents 
estimated the previous year’s prices rather accurately but overestimated those of 
15 years previously. In a 1987 study, 271 Christchurch residents underestimated 
the cost of the previous year but the prices of 15 years were overestimated 
(Kemp, 1987). These results were consistent for both general and specific 
items. The conclusion appears to be that past price changes are fairly accurately 
recalled for the near past but not remembered but estimated in a general way for 
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dates in the more distant past. Kemp suggests that expectations of future price 
rises were linked to such general estimations of past price rises. (1987).
Dixon et al. (2014) also use a large data set to assess lay people’s responses and 
sentiments in Australia to a number of issues related to the economy, including 
prices and employment. They infer bivariate relationships from respondents’ 
answers. Their most striking findings are the strong correlation between the 
survey question dealing with perceptions of unemployment and the responses 
to the question dealing with expectations of future economic conditions. The 
association between prices and unemployment expectations is positive and 
consistent with the ‘good-begets-good heuristic’ for the majority of the months in 
the sample period (2014:9). Leiser and Aroch (2009) explains the ‘good-begets-
good heuristic’. Leiser and Aroch (2009) opines that ‘…naïve participants rely 
on a simple but powerful heuristic: the economic world functions in either a 
virtuous or a vicious circle. An increase in one good variable will increase the 
values of other good variables, and decrease those of bad variables. This good-
begets-good heuristic settles in most cases how to answer’ (2009:381).
It is necessary to point out that the question Dixon et al. (2014) ask about 
prices is about the level rather than the rate of price changes. However, they 
claim support from the Ranyard et al. (2008) study summarised above, where 
it is concluded that ‘(t)he main insight from the review is that while consumers 
may have a limited ability to store and recall specific prices and even succumb to 
a number of biases in the way in which they form perceptions and expectations 
of global price changes, they do seem to have some feel for, and ability to judge 
and forecast inflation’ (2008:397).
Biau et al. (2010) argue that Euro area consumers hold very different opinions 
of inflation, reporting that ‘…perceptions and expectations of inflation range 
from high, or in some cases very high, to low and close to the official rate 
of inflation’ (2010:ii). However, the research has shown that consumers in 
the European Union generally have the perception that actual price increases 
exceed the official inflation rate and they tend to do so by more than evidenced 
in comparable surveys outside the Euro area. No research has been undertaken 
to date on reasons for this tendency. Respondents reveal different perceptions 
and expectations depending upon income, age, education and gender. However, 
there remain questions about the data and the design of the survey questionnaire, 
which had included open ended questions related to ‘consumer prices’, and 
failed to probe unusual/outlier responses.
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Issing (2006:211) also highlights the fact that respondents in the Euro area 
overestimate inflation perceptions and points out that problems with perceived 
inflation in the European Union have been exacerbated since January 2002, i.e. 
from the introduction of a single European currency (2006:213). Among the 
reasons for this perception, Issing (2006:214) states that some consumers still 
use historic prices at the time of currency conversion as reference for price 
levels, thus discarding moderate inflation over the ensuing period.
Antonides (2008) analyses data from Eurostat and the EU Business and 
Consumer Surveys to show that significant correlations were found between 
perceived inflation and the rate of price changes in the EU as a whole and in 
a number of member countries (2008:429). Price changes for items including 
food and drinks, furniture and appliances did not significantly explain inflation 
perceptions in the selected countries, despite the weight of these categories in 
the Laspeyres price index, suggesting that consumers’ inflation perceptions are 
based on price changes of some highly selective consumer items, in contrast 
with the Laspeyres price index weighting price changes by the budget shares of 
consumers. (2008:430).
Forsells and Kenny (2002) also use the EU Consumer Survey to assess the 
rationality of inflation expectations in the Euro area, and conclude that consumer 
expectations provide ‘…important information on actual future developments in 
euro area inflation. In particular they provide an unbiased predictor of inflation 
one year ahead, and most strikingly, correctly anticipated the trend decline in 
inflation over the 1990s’ (2002:5). More generally they find ‘growing’ rationality 
in euro area inflation expectations in the 1990s compared with the 1980s. This 
may be because consumers in the Euro Zone have become better at predicting 
inflation. But less volatile inflation and greater ECB credibility may also make 
it easier to predict future inflation.
2.3. The South African literature
In a South African context, Rossouw et al. (2008) reported the results of a survey 
of inflation perceptions and the accuracy of past inflation figures among central 
bank employees, in that case the SA Reserve Bank. South Africa followed at 
the time of the survey (and still follows) an inflation-targeting monetary policy 
framework, with the central bank entrusted with the mandate of ensuring 
that inflation remains within the target range of 3 to 6 per cent per annum. 
Despite this mandate, the survey among central bank employees showed clearly 
perceptions that the actual rate of inflation was higher than the rate reported by 
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the authorities. This showed a lack of credibility at the time of the survey among 
its own employees in the very policy anchor that the central bank had to use. 
This raises serious questions about any ability of the general public to perceive 
the inflation rate as an accurate indicator of price increases.
Monique Reid (2009) has adopted an existing methodology, using market data 
and not surveys, during the 5 year period immediately after the SA Reserve 
Bank switched to inflation targeting to measure the sensitivity of South African 
inflation to macroeconomic surprises. She finds that the degree of sensitivity 
of local inflation expectations in the period under review is comparable 
to international standards, i.e. financial markets react less sensitively to 
macroeconomic surprises. This suggests that the monetary authorities are 
communicating well with the public in anchoring inflation expectations, but she 
warns that as credibility is not a one off exercise, continuous efforts are required 
to promote sound communication with financial markets through transparent 
and predictable monetary policy. 
In a later paper, Reid (2012) analysed the formation of inflation expectations 
among the general public in South Africa, ‘…who are responsible for the 
majority of the price setting behaviour in South Africa…’ (2012:4) to assess how 
the central bank can improve its communication with this group in an attempt to 
influence their inflation expectations. Reid concludes that ‘…financial analysts 
adjust their inflation expectations quicker and more accurately than price 
setters’ (2012:31). This provides evidence of ‘sticky’ inflation expectations, 
with the general public responding with a lag to central bank communication 
and information on inflation.
2.4. Summary of literature review
Our survey of a vast and varied international and South African literature 
suggests that while inflation expectations are indeed anchored in perceptions 
of price changes (historic prices), these perceptions are themselves impacted 
upon by a wide range of factors which include both economic phenomena such 
as income, demographic factors such as age and gender, as well as social and 
psychological considerations such as trust, justice, and personality. Moreover, 
‘reference pricing’ as identified by Issing (2006) can play a role in perceptions, 
e.g. the date of conversion from one currency to another. However, if central 
bank officials, who are entrusted the responsibility of exercising the mandate 
of containing inflation in terms of an inflation targeting monetary policy as is 
followed in South Africa, report perceptions of actual inflation exceeding official 
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inflation figures, it really begs the question whether low credibility in historic 
inflation and prices among the general public should not be viewed as the rule, 
rather than the exception. 
3. Inflation perceptions and inflation expectations
The 2014-survey discussed in this paper followed the same basic design as 
previous inflation perceptions surveys in South Africa and the BER’s inflation 
expectations surveys in question design. The 2014-survey is a survey of 
inflation perceptions and inflation expectations undertaken by IPSOS on behalf 
of the authors of this paper. The inflation perception and inflation expectation 
survey formed part of a broader Kayabus Survey that covers questions on 
numerous economic and social aspects. The survey covers 3 500 urban and rural 
respondents in South Africa, and covers all racial groups in the country. Given 
its wide coverage and the sample size, the survey results are representative of 
the views of the South African population. Field work for the survey was done 
between 16 September 2014 and 24 October 2014.
Respondents were provided with the average inflation rate of the past five 
years and of the past 12 months before they were asked to give their perception 
of inflation over the past 12 months and their expectations of future inflation. 
Table 1 shows the exact question that was posed to respondents. It was the first 
time in South Africa that the same respondents were asked to respond on ‘both 
sides’ (past perceptions and future expectations) on their views on inflation. 
taBle 1: inFlation perCeptionS and expeCtationS queStion 2014
Inflation perceptions 
question QE1
Over the past five years prices 
increased by on average 5.5% 
per year. During 2013 prices 
increased by 5.7%. By about 
how much do you think prices in 
general increased during the past 
12 months?




By about how much do you 
expect prices in general to 
increase during the NEXT 12 
months?




The perceptions of past inflation of each respondent could therefore be linked 
to the expectation of future inflation of the same respondent. It is accordingly 
possible to show the degree in which inflation expectations are linked in 
inflation perceptions. The survey results indeed show such a link. In South 
Africa expectations of inflation of respondents (consumers) are linked to their 
inflation perceptions.
3.1. Analysis of 2014 survey results
Before drawing conclusions on inflation perceptions and expectations, it is 
imperative to understand respondents’ general responses to inflation questions. 
The results showed that of those that responded to the 2014-survey on inflation 
perceptions and inflation expectations in South Africa (the first and only such 
survey), around 37 per cent responded ‘don’t know’ to the questions on their 
views on inflation in South Africa. Compared to the results of Jonung (1981), 
who reported a 20 per cent ‘don’t know’ response rate, this is quite high, which, 
according to Ranyard et al. (2008), indicates that a significant proportion of 
respondents had no or limited knowledge of the inflation rate. In the South 
African case it also likely suggests that respondents have limited knowledge of 
inflation or that they don’t really follow price changes in their consumer basket.
The incidence of ‘don’t know’ responses to surveys on matters pertaining to 
inflation is not new in a South African context. Kershoff (2000) pointed out at 
the time of the first survey on consumers’ inflation expectations in South Africa, 
undertaken in 2000, that ‘don’t know’ responses in that survey amounted to 17,2 
per cent of respondents.  
The incidence of “don’t know” responses in South Africa in general, and 
in the joint inflation perceptions/inflation expectations survey of 2014 is also 
evident from other surveys, with large margins of difference in such responses 
as percentage of the sample size. At the one extreme Kokoszcznski et al. (2010) 
reported on the incidence of ‘don’t know’ responses in inflation perception and 
inflation expectation surveys undertaken in the period 2001 to 2005 in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.  The highest incidence of ‘don’t know’ 
responses for inflation expectations was reported at 9,9 per cent in the Czech 
Republic, although it went as low as 3,3 per cent in Slovakia (Kokoszcznski et 
al. 2010:80).  For inflation perceptions an even lower incidence of ‘don’t know’ 
responses was reported, going as low as 1,3 per cent in Hungary (Kokoszcznski 
et al.; 2010:79).
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To the contrary, M&G YouGov3 reported high percentages of ‘don’t know’ 
responses to a question ‘(w)hat annual rate of inflation do you expect 12 months 
from now?’ (2014:4). They reported these responses as 35,4 per cent in Austria, 
56,8 per cent in France, 30,6 per cent in Germany, 17,4 per cent in Hong Kong, 
35,4 per cent in Italy, 19,3 per cent in Singapore, 39,9 per cent in Spain, 36,2 per 
cent in Switzerland and 34,1 per cent in the United Kingdom, (2014:4). They 
reported even higher rates of ‘don’t know’ responses to the question ‘(w)hat 
annual rate of inflation do you expect five years from now?’ (M&G YouGov, 
2014:4), peaking at 64,3 per cent in France.
No clear trend in ‘don’t know’ responses is discernible from international 
experiences, but 37 per cent of respondents reporting in the 2014-survey in South 
Africa that they ‘don’t know’ is aligned to the range of responses reported by 
M&G YouGov (2014).
A probit model was estimated to determine the likelihood of the respondents 
responding with a value response, as opposed to ‘don’t know’ to the inflation 
perception and inflation expectations questions based on their demographic 
characteristics in Table 2. 
The probability of respondents providing a value answer can be written as: 
           (1)
where ⱷ follows a normal cumulative distribution function, and Y is the 
dependent variable which can take up the value of 0 or 1, where 0 represents 
don’t know responses and  Y + 1 if respondents provided a value response. 
X1 represents a set of independent dummy variables. These include age of the 
respondents, population group, gender, employment status, education, income, 
province and marital status. The baseline are those aged 25-34 years old, black 
population group, male, full time employed, completed matric with an income of 
R800 to R3999 in Gauteng province who are single.  
3. M&G YouGov’s Inflation Expectations Survey is a survey undertaken quarterly on behalf 
of M&G Investments by YouGov, an international market research agency specialising in 
various sectors of the economy.  See M&G YouGov (2014: 8) for more detail.
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taBle 2: inFluenCe oF demoGraphiC CharaCteriStiCS on proBaBility oF anSwerinG queStionS
Characteristic Inflation perception question Inflation expectation question
Coefficient Z-stat Coefficient Z-stat
16-24 0.128 0.990 0.104 0.800
35-49 -0.207 -2.060 -0.164 -1.610
50+ -0.433 -3.260 -0.379 -2.820
White 0.385 2.450 0.443 2.820
Indian 0.324 0.970 0.196 0.610
Coloured -0.141 -0.980 -0.127 -0.890
Female -0.073 -0.920 -0.007 -0.090
Part-time employed 0.004 0.030 0.023 0.180
Housewife 0.059 0.250 0.091 0.390
Student -0.012 -0.060 0.008 0.040
Retired 0.181 1.030 0.275 1.600
Unemployed 0.060 0.510 0.014 0.120
No schooling -0.273 -1.010 -0.281 -1.030
Technical qualification 0.264 1.960 0.205 1.510
Secretarial -0.174 -0.300 -0.181 -0.310
Professional 0.486 2.350 0.468 2.460
Student 0.000 0.000
R1-R799 -0.008 -0.060 -0.108 -0.890
R4000-R7999 0.108 0.990 0.150 1.410
R8000+ 0.287 2.020 0.331 2.270
Western Cape 0.566 3.360 0.705 4.430
Eastern Cape -0.290 -2.580 -0.324 -2.860
Northern Cape -0.825 -4.160 -0.846 -4.310
Free State 1.288 5.330 1.321 5.390
KZN -0.245 -2.230 -0.296 -2.710
North West Province 0.533 2.850 0.339 1.860
Mpumalanga 0.273 1.360 0.329 1.620
Limpopo 0.336 2.450 0.348 2.540
Married 0.131 1.160 0.113 1.000
Living together 0.167 1.270 0.107 0.820
Widowed 0.003 0.020 -0.122 -0.610
Divorced 0.194 0.650 -0.047 -0.160
Separated -0.525 -1.640 -0.400 -1.250
Constant 0.257 2.070 0.198 1.620
Observations 1931 1931
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.12
Source: Own research
183
Bosch, Rossouw and Padayachee: Linking inflation perceptions and expectations in South Africa
From the results, those older than the reference group (25-34) were less likely 
to have an actual value response to both the inflation perception and inflation 
expectation question. This may be due to older respondents perhaps not making 
the time to think about the question when asked or that they are not as informed 
regarding price changes and economic information as their younger counterparts 
who might still be studying or just entered the labour market. Compared to 
African respondents, white respondents were more likely to have an actual 
response to both questions. Interestingly, retired respondents were significantly 
more likely to give a value response to inflation expectations, compared to full 
time employed respondents. Because retired respondents most likely live on 
a retirement pension, they probably keep a closer eye on the goods and the 
prices of the goods that they purchase. In terms of education, respondents with 
a technical qualification as well as professionals were more likely to provide 
an inflation perception and inflation expectations value response. Those in the 
highest income category (R8000+) were more likely to provide an actual value 
inflation perception figure, compared to those who earned between R800 – 
R3999. Both the R4000 – R7999 and the R8000+ group were more likely to 
provide an inflation expectation figure. Compared to Gauteng, people residing 
in the Western Cape, Free State, North West province and Limpopo were more 
likely to give an inflation perception as well as inflation expectation value 
response, while households residing in the Eastern Cape, Northern Cape and 
KZN were less likely. This is likely due to Gauteng being an urban economic 
hub with more people in employment, and when comparing areas which are 
more rural (Eastern Cape, Northern Cape and KZN), people are less likely to 
know prices either because they are less informed or because their consumer 
behaviour differs from that of someone purchasing monthly groceries at a chain 
store. Lastly, compared to single respondents, separated persons had a lower 
likelihood of providing an actual value inflation perception response.
The average perceived inflation rate of those who did answer the question 
in the 2014-survey in South Africa was higher than the official inflation rate 
at 8,5 per cent, compared to the actual inflation rate of 5,9 per cent. Figure 
1 shows the distribution of responses for both the inflation perceptions and 
inflation expectations questions. From the spike in inflation perceptions, it 
seems that inflation perceptions are more contained around the 5 to 6 per cent 
level, compared to inflation expectations.
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FiGure 1: diStriBution oF inFlation perCeptionS and expeCtationS 2014
Male respondents had a higher inflation perception, compared to females. 
This is contrary to the finding of Jonung (1981), who showed that females 
perceived inflation to be higher than males and ascribed this finding at the time 
to the fact that woman were more exposed to food prices and increases in such 
prices than men. Kemp (1987), however, found that increased familiarity with 
specific prices tended to result in less accurate estimates of past prices for the 
item in question. 
Ranyard et al. (2008) state that the inflation experience of low-income 
households (i.e. the actual price increases experienced) may not reflect price 
increases measured by CPI. The CPI is biased towards the consumption 
spending patterns of middle- and high-income households, as these households 
account for the bulk of consumption expenditure in any economy, compared 
to consumption expenditure by low-income households. Inflation rates for 
different products vary considerably, so lower income households may purchase 
more food items which could have a lower weight in the overall CPI basket 
as it measures the average expenditure on food (as opposed to the share of 
income spent on the item). These lower income households therefore may have 
a tendency to overestimate their own inflation compared to the overall rate of 
inflation in a jurisdiction, which includes price increases for all income groups.
From a comparison of current price data of food and groceries with price data 
of 2006, Rossouw (2015) found some evidence for higher inflation perceptions 
by low income groups in South Africa.  Rossouw (2015) assessed the accuracy 
of South African inflation data since 1922 by adjusting historic prices recorded 
for selected food items, household consumables and clothing since 1922, 1974 
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and 2006 for inflation and comparing the adjusted prices to the current prices 
of the same items. Prices increased broadly in accordance with the inflation rate 
since 1922 and 1974. To the contrary, the rate of inflation broadly underreports 
price increases since 2006 for most items in all classes of goods compared. 
As the prices used in the comparison (in the main food and clothing prices) 
have a comparatively higher weight in the expenditure basket of the low income 
group, Rossouw (2015) concludes that the poor suffers as a consequence of 
sustained and underreported inflation. Moreover, the analysis provides grounds 
for perceptions that historic price increases exceed price increases reported by 
the inflation rate.
Figure 2 shows that respondents in the highest income quintile perceived 
and expect lower inflation, compared to those in the lower income categories. 
These results mirror results found by Bryan and Ventaku (2001b). According 
to official price statistics however, respondents in the lower income groups had 
similar actual CPI inflation as compared to those in the higher income groups 
over this period, suggesting that respondents in the lower income quintile likely 
experienced higher levels of actual in-the-store inflation, as represented by their 
higher average inflation perceptions and expectations.
FiGure 2: inFlation perCeptionS and expeCtationS By houSehold inCome quintileS vS 
aCtual inFlation outComeS
Source: Statistics South Africa and own research
Figure 3 illustrates the differences between inflation perceptions and actual 
income-quintile-specific inflation rates. It is evident that both the perception 
and expectations bias is higher amongst the lower income quintiles. This result 
was also found by Leung (2009). Interestingly, at the top two quintiles, inflation 
expectations bias is much larger than inflation perception bias, while in the 
bottom quintiles, the biases are more similar.
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FiGure 3: diFFerenCeS Between inFlation perCeptionS and aCtual hiStoriC inFlation 
and expeCtationS and aCtual inFlation outComeS By houSehold inCome qunitileS
Source: Own research
This could be that lower income respondents experience higher prices, and 
therefore their perception bias is higher than their expectation, while higher 
income respondents do not experience higher prices than inflation, however, they 
have more information available to them and can price inflation expectations in 
to their environment (see Figure 4 and Table 3 for CPI price data).
FiGure 4: hiStoriC inFlation By expenditure (inCome) quintileS
Source: Own research
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2009 9.0 9.1 8.9 8.0 6.6 7.1
2010 3.1 3.2 3.4 4.0 4.6 4.3
2011 6.0 5.8 5.6 5.7 4.7 5.0
2012 7.0 6.8 6.6 6.4 5.3 5.7
2013 6.3 6.0 5.9 6.1 5.7 5.8
2014 6.2 6.1 6.1 6.0 6.0 6.1
Source: Statistics South Africa (2009-2014).
Ranyard et al. (2008) also argue that incomes impacts on inflation perceptions, 
as a respondent may perceive to be less affected by a price increase if the person 
has also had an increase in income. Fisher (1986) conceptualised this as if prices 
are perceived to increase faster than income, people will experience a decrease 
in their well-being. Gärling and Gamble (2006) showed that when the average 
inflation was increasing, the respondents felt that products were getting more 
expensive, unless income increased at the same time. 
Table 4 contains a summary of inflation perceptions and expectations by 
various demographic characteristics of the respondents. According to Bryan and 
Venkatu (2001a) and Leung (2009) whites [or European ethnicity] perceived 
and anticipated lower inflation compared to non-whites [or non-European 
ethnicity]. Our results show that White and Black respondents had similar 
inflation perceptions, which were higher than those who were Indian or coloured. 
However in terms of inflation expectations, Black respondents had the lowest 
average inflation expectations.  
Our results differ largely from Bryan and Venkatu (2001a) and Leung (2009)’s 
when analysing inflation perceptions and expectations by age groups and marital 
status. Our findings show that middle-aged respondents perceive and anticipate 
higher inflation than young respondents. Furthermore, married respondents 
perceived and expected higher inflation, compared to single respondents. 
Interestingly, divorced respondents reported a much higher average inflation 
expectations rate than the other respondents. In practice divorced respondents 
could have more incentive to have a higher view of inflation, as price increases 
usually form part of legal financial settlements.
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Indian / Asian 6.66 9.97
Coloured 7.48 9.57
16 - 24 7.98 8.36
25 - 34 8.37 8.57
35 - 49 9.48 9.93
50+ 8.62 8.97




Top 20% 6.82 7.22
Working full-time 9.37 9.96
Working part-time 8.03 8.03
Not Working - Housewife 7.85 7.86
Not Working - Student 8.42 8.52
Not Working - Retired 8.08 8.92
Unemployed -  looking for work 8.83 9.09
Unemployed -  not looking for work 5.78 6.42
Single 8.32 8.65
Married 9.01 9.49




Western Cape 6.9 8.5
Eastern Cape 6.9 7.1
Northern Cape 11.1 9.4
Free State 23.9 21.6
KwaZulu Natal 6.0 6.4
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When looking at respondents’ responses by highest level of education (or in 
other words skill levels), those who completed only matric as their highest level 
of education had the highest perceptions and expectations. Interestingly, students 
had the lowest perceptions and expectations. This could be due to perhaps a lack 
of inflation experience or relying on someone else to make purchases for them.
3.2. Inflation perception and expectation bias calculated from the 2014 survey
To determine the magnitude of the difference between respondents’ perception 
(expectations) of inflation over the past twelve months (next twelve months) 
and the actual outcome of inflation over the same period, an inflation perception 
(inflation expectations) bias can be defined as:
          (2)
where Ppe is the inflation perception bias and P
y
t-1 is the inflation perception 
of respondents over the past twelve months, starting in October 2014 (when 
the survey was conducted), while Pt-1 is the actual inflation rate over the same 
twelve months. t - 1 refers to the average over the past 12 months. Similarly the 
inflation expectations bias can be constructed as:
          (3)
where Ppe is the inflation expectations bias and P
e
t+1 is the inflation expectations 
of respondents for the next twelve months, while Pt+1 is the actual outcome of 
inflation over the same twelve months. t + 1 refers to the average over the next 
12 months.
Figure 5 plots each respondent’s perception error on one axis against the 
respondent’s expectations error on the other. It shows that there is a relatively 
strong correlation between the two errors at lower values of the errors. The 
average ratio between the two were below one, indicating that the degree of 
bias in estimating current inflation is less than that of estimating one year ahead 
inflation. Leung (2009) suggests that this is most likely due to people having 
more information on current inflation than future inflation.
There seems to be a recognisable difference between household income quintiles 
and person income quintiles. However, it should be noted that of the person 
income question, there were 46 per cent non-responses or no income, while for 
the household income question there were only 29,3 per cent non-responses or 
no income responses. 
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FiGure 5: eStimation error on Current inFlation and eStimation error on expeCted 
inFlation
Source: Own research
Controlling for selected individual characteristics, we define an OLS 
regression to determine the effect that inflation perception bias has on inflation 
expectations as follows:
          (4)
where i indicates individual responses and Xh is a vector of demographic 
characteristics. εh is a random error term.
The results in Table 5 show that the coefficient for inflation perception bias 
is significant and positive; indicating that around 70 per cent of changes in 
inflation expectations bias can be explained by changes in inflation perception 
bias when controlling for demographic characteristics.
This means that respondents who had a positive perception bias also had a 
positive expectations bias. Furthermore, compared to those between 24 and 
34 (the base), respondents between 16 and 24 years had a significantly higher 
inflation expectations bias. Similarly, compared to full time employed, part-time 
employed and students had a lower inflation expectations bias. Compared to those 
with some schooling, respondents with a technical qualification, professionals 
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and students had a lower inflation expectations bias. This shows that education 
and skill levels play an important role in how respondents derive their inflation 
perceptions. Interestingly, here was no significant difference between income 
groups. North West province and Mpumalanga had a significant lower inflation 
expectations bias, compared to respondents in Gauteng. As Gauteng is more of 
an urban economic hub prices might be higher in general. We can also look at 
Gauteng’s inflation rate to substantiate this. Compared to single respondents, 
married respondents had a higher inflation expectations bias, while respondents 
with children younger than 15 years old in their household, had a significantly 
higher inflation expectation bias, compared to other respondents, likely because 
they have a very different consumer basket and therefore might experience 
higher price inflation in these goods.
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taBle 5: impaCt oF perCeption BiaS on inFlation expeCtationS BiaS
 Characteristic Expectations bias
Coefficient T-stat













No schooling 0.273 0.360







Western Cape 0.152 0.300
Eastern Cape -0.550 -0.660
Northern Cape -1.227 -1.440
Free State 1.320 1.110
KZN -0.083 -0.120








Children younger than 15 in household 0.860 2.000**
Constant 1.709 2.300
*p<0.1; ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01
Source: Own research
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3.3 Inflation perception feed through to inflation expectations shown by the 
2014 survey results
Jonung (1981) found a significant positive correlation coefficient between 
perceived and expected inflation of about 0,5. A similar result was reported by 
van der Klaauw et al. (2008) for the US. We found a positive and significant 
correlation coefficient of 0,76 when using the Spearman’s rank correlation test, 
where the H0 states that the variables do not have a rank-order relationship. At 
the one per cent level we reject the H0, and we conclude that higher inflation 
perceptions do lead to higher inflation expectations. 
Table 6 shows that consumers’ inflation expectations matched their inflation 
perceptions. Consumers who reported below 5,5 per cent inflation perceptions, 
mostly also reported below 5,5 per cent inflation perceptions. Consumers 
who had higher inflation perceptions, mostly also had similar high inflation 
expectations.




1%-5,5 % 5,6%-10% 11%-15% 16%-20% 21% plus Total
1%-5,5 % 78.7 20.0 0.2 0.0 1.2 100.0
5,6%-10% 12.5 80.2 4.8 0.8 1.7 100.0
11%-15% 2.7 15.0 60.4 8.9 13.0 100.0
16%-20% 6.0 10.1 0.0 17.7 66.2 100.0
21% plus 1.9 5.5 4.7 9.3 78.5 100.0
Total 40.2 48.2 3.8 1.2 6.7 100.0
Source: Own research
4. Conclusions
This paper evaluates information on South African consumer inflation perceptions 
and expectations, against the backdrop of the SA Reserve Bank’s inflation 
targeting regime with price stability as the main objective. The first goal which 
was addressed in our review of the literature was to explore the process of forming 
perceptions and expectations. Studies revealed that this process is a complex one 
informed both by economic factors as well as a range of social, psychological and 
political considerations. Universally, studies also found that the understanding 
of inflation by the general public was limited, and that inflation perceptions and 
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expectations were closely linked to respondents’ direct environment such as their 
feelings about their country’s political regime, their exposure to economic decision 
making, their ability to accurately recall prices, as well as their economic position 
in society. Lower income earners tend to experience higher price increases as the 
weights of goods in their consumer basket is very different from the weights in 
the average consumer price index basket.
Our second goal was to introduce the results of the fourth round of a survey 
on inflation perceptions and inflation expectations in South Africa. This was 
the first round where the same consumers were asked about their views on 
historic prices, as well as their expectations of future price increases. It is of 
some significance to point out that this was also the very first time that this has 
been done in South Africa. 
Thirdly, our findings show that those who were older than the middle-
aged had a lower probability of responding to the inflation questions. White 
respondents were more likely to provide a response to the inflation questions, 
while retired consumers were more likely than full-time employed to give a 
response to inflation expectations. The probability of a response was also higher 
for respondents with a technical or professional qualification and for those in the 
higher income groups.
Fourthly, we show that the bottom income quintile likely experience higher 
prices than the official CPI, as they had much higher inflation perception and 
inflation expectations than the average CPI over the period (also when taking 
the CPI for each quintile). 
Last, the paper shows, again for the first time, that there is indeed a feed 
through from inflation perception to inflation expectations in South Africa. 
Therefore, inflation perceptions play a crucial role in the formulation of inflation 
expectations in South Africa. These results suggest that policy makers are not 
just charged with containing inflation expectations, but that they should also be 
vigilant that the confidence in official statistics, as well as the confidence in the 
SA Reserve Bank and government, impacts inflation perceptions which in turn 
directly feed into inflation expectations. The centrality of consistent, accurate and 
effective communication by the monetary authorities, as well as by government, 
in all matters related to information dissemination both about inflation and 
prices, and about general economic data cannot be over-emphasised. Innovative 
means of communication to reach low income earners with such information 
have to be developed, and we believe the results of succeeding in this latter 
objective may be very significant.
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